Moving From the Outside In? Ross Perot and Anti-Incumbency in the 1992 Congressional Races by Prinz, Timothy S.
Journal of Political Science 
Volume 22 Number 1 Article 3 
November 1994 
Moving From the Outside In? Ross Perot and Anti-Incumbency in 
the 1992 Congressional Races 
Timothy S. Prinz 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Prinz, Timothy S. (1994) "Moving From the Outside In? Ross Perot and Anti-Incumbency in the 1992 
Congressional Races," Journal of Political Science: Vol. 22 : No. 1 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol22/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Politics at CCU Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Political Science by an authorized editor of CCU Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact commons@coastal.edu. 
MOVING FROM THE OUTSIDE 
IN? ROSS PEROT AND ANTI-
INCUMBENCY IN THE 1992 
CONGRESSIONAL RACES 
Timothy S. Prinz, University of Virginia 
The 1992 election was certainly one of the most unusual in recent 
memory. George Bush's fall from grace, Bill Clinton's rebound from 
scandal time and time again, and the emergence of Ross Perot as 
perhaps the ultimate "outsider" candidate made for a fascinating and 
unpredictable election year. A similar uncertainty was attached to the 
1992 elections to Congress. Put simply, 1992 was not a good year to 
be known as a political insider for members of Congress. A long series 
of scandals (the House bank, the House post office) and seeming policy 
failures reduced public support for Congress to an all-time low. The 
emergence of Perot's anti-Washington message combined with a 
burgeoning tenn limitations movement meant that more than a few 
incumbents were worried about returning to Capitol Hill. 
Some have argued that the outsider dimension is the key to 
understanding the politics of 1992 (Ceaser and Busch 1993). At the 
presidential level, Bill Clinton best captured the traditional dimension 
of party and ideology, as well as the new outsider dimension in 
American politics. And in the congressional races, the outsider 
dimension produced an unprecedented turnover in the House and Senate, 
as many an incumbent retired rather than risk the prospect of electoral 
defeat, and several more were defeated in the primary and general 
elections. 
To what extent did the outsider dimension influence the politics of 
congressional elections in 1992? Certainly the emergence of Ross 
Perot reinforced a growing anti-incumbent sentiment, raising the 
possibility that the elections were powerfully influenced by these 
forces. At the very least, it would appear that Perot gave substance and 
force to the voters' desire for change in Washington, for an end to 
An earlier version of this paper was prepared for presenlalion at the 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
Washington, DC, September 2-5, 1993. I am grateful to Steve Finkel, Alan 
Abramowitz, John Geer, Peverill Squire, and Larry Sabato for helpful 
comments, and to the National Elections Studies for the data. Any errors in 
analysis or interpretation remain my responsibilily. 
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"gridlock" and "politics as usual". 
This paper examines the influence of Ross Perot in the 1992 
congressional elections, focusing particularly on whether Perot's anti-
Washington message translated into an anti-incumbent vote in the 1992 
House and Senate races. Despite the expectation that Ross Perot might 
have influenced voters' decisions in these races, there is little evidence 
of a Perot effect in either the House or the Senate. By and large, these 
elections went more or less by the book: although national forces 
played a role in these races, Ross Perot did not, and local candidates and 
local campaigns mattered much more for explaining the vote. Section 
one presents the case for and against Perot's influence in the 
congressional races. Section two focuses on the results on the House 
side, relying on data from the 1992 National Elections Study and Voter 
Research Survey's exit poll, and Section three relies on the same data 
for an analysis of Senate races. Section four presents a concluding 
discussion of these results and the prospecls for "political outsiders" in 
future congressional races. 
Ross Perot and the Race for Congress 
When it comes to explaining the politics of congressional 
elections, scholars of Congress are fond of quoting Tip O'Neill's well-
known aphorism that "all politics is local." Generally speaking, the 
literature on congressional elections has described these races (especially 
for the House) as largely local affairs over local candidates and local 
issues. Only occasionally do national forces or national issues intercede 
to influence outcomes in these races (Jacobson 1993). 
Yet, from the very outset the 1992 House and Senate elections 
looked anything but conventional. Many House members were feeling 
the effects of the check-bouncing scandal at the House bank, 
redistricting had created an aura of uncertainty for many an incumbent 
seeking to return to Capitol Hill, and public support for the Congress 
and its legislative product had reached an all-time low. In addition, a 
growing term limits movement combined with the roller coaster-like 
character of the presidential election and the emergence of Ross Perot to 
further dampen the prospects of incumbent members of Congress. All 
indications were that the time was ripe for sweeping change in both the 
House and the Senate. 
Despite this growing disaffection with the Congress, voters sent 
mixed messages to their representatives in Washington. Once again, 
over 90 percent of incumbents seeking reelection to the House won 
their races , and 85 percent of Senate incumbents won as well. On the 
face of it, these resulls are quite slriking . Despite widespread 
dissatisfaction with politics as usual, the vast majority of voters still 
chose to return their incumbent representatives to Washington. One 
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observer's description of the 1990 elections might well be applied to 
1992: 
Most Americans blamed Congress for a large part of 
the trouble with America; most Americans also made 
an exception in the case of their own 
representatives .... How long can this pressure and 
these contradictions build without exploding? Which 
election will bring on the voter eruption? (Bennett 
1992: 9) 
It would be an understatement to say that many thought 1992 would 
produce the voter reaction Bennett describes. The combination of 
scandal, anti-Washington sentiment, and Ross Perot's unique populist 
message appeared to be more than sufficient to wreak havoc on 
Congress. 
Yet, change did occur in the institution. Thanks to a substantial 
number of retirements by incumbents, 110 new members were elected 
to the House, producing the largest freshman class since 1948, and in 
all 14 new Senators also took their places on Capitol Hill. In addition, 
the representation of women and other minority groups in Congress 
rose substantially as a result of the 1992 elections. Change did come to 
the institution, but not directly via the ballot box, nor did the turnover 
do much to alter the partisan balance in Congress. 
Interpreting these results is no easy task. On the one hand, the 
glass appears to be half full, since substantial change did occur in 
Congress as a result of the election; on the other hand, the glass is also 
half empty, as voters retained their habit of supporting incumbents 
seeking reelection. While one might argue that Ross Perot, term 
limitations, and a growing outsider dimension were responsible for the 
substantial turnover in Congress, it is hard to build more than 
circumstantial case for this conclusion. 
On the face of it, there is good reason to believe that Ross Perot's 
presence in the presidential race had a large impact on the 1992 House 
races. Perot developed a substantial following in all 50 states around 
the theme of returning government to its rightful owners--the people. 
Taken to its logical extreme, such a call for reform could have resulted 
in sweeping change in the House and Senate, as voters opted to "throw 
the rascals out" and elect a new slate of representatives to serve in 
Washington. Thus, the expectation here is straightforward: Perot's brand 
of populism and no-nonsense approach to government struck a chord 
with voters in 1992, one that might be expected to resonate not only in 
the voters' choice of presidential candidates, but also in their selection 
of representatives to the House and Senate. From the standpoint of pure 
numbers, Perot won almost one out of every five votes cast in the 
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presidential race. If prospective challengers were able to harness Perot's 
message and themes to the service of anti-incumbency, the Perot factor 
alone would have been sufficient to make any incumbent with a 
comfortable 20-point cushion exceedingly nervous. 
On the other hand, a case can also be made for the absence of 
Perot's influence on House races. Challengers may not have been well 
positioned to exploit the Perot phenomenon. Perot rose to prominence 
relatively late in the electoral cycle, in many cases after the filing 
deadline for House and Senate candidates had passed . Even further, it 
may have been difficult for even strong challengers to exploit Perot's 
message and momentum on behalf of their candidacies . In general, 
challengers would have to walk a fine line between seeking to woo 
Perot voters and alienating their base of support. Finally, the in and 
out and in again nature of Perot's presidential bid may have served to 
mute the impact he might have exerted on congressional races. 
Certainly congressional candidates would have found it difficult to read 
the winds of political change and predict how best to respond in their 
own races. 
Thus , the stage is set for this examination of Ross Perot's 
influence on the 1992 House and Senate races. On the one hand, it is 
worth asking whether Perot 's presence incited an anti-incumbent 
movement in these races. On the other hand, there are good reasons to 
doubt the influence of Perot. House races in particular are notorious for 
being local races largely immune to the influence of national forces, and 
redistricting, the economy , scandal, and other factors also probably 
played a role in shaping the 1992 results. In such a setting, it may be 
difficult to observe a Perot effect. Nonetheless , there is always the 
possibility that 1992 might have been different, and that at long last the 
voter rebellion expected by many observers finally appeared. 
Ross Perot and Anti-Incumbency in the 1992 House 
Races 
The literature on congressional elections describes House races as 
largely a function of partisan forces and familiarity with and evaluations 
of the two candidates in the race. Thus, 
Equation 1: VOTECHOICE =a+ b1PARTYID + b2KNOWLEDGE 
+ b3EVALUATIONS + e 
represents a fairly standard model of the vote choice in House races 
(Jacobson 1992). The simplest test for a Perot effect is to incorporate a 
variety of measures from the 1992 National Election Study of 
congressional voters that are designed to account for this effect in 
Equation 1. 
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TABLE 1. PEROT VOTERS AND ANTI-INCUMBENCY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: VOfE FOR JNCUMBENT 
(Probit estimates) 
INDEPEN-
DENT STANDARD PEROf DEMO. REPUB. 
VARIABLE MODEL VOfERS INCUMB. INCUMB. 
Constant 0.05 0.06 0.24 -0.41 
(0.33) (0.33) (0.39) (0.(,6) 
Party 1.20* 1.19* 1.21* 1.29* 
Identification (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.24) 
Familiar 0.13 0.12 0.04 0.42 
with (0.34) (0.34) (0.39) (0.69) 
Incumbent 
Familiar 
-0.28* -0.29* -0.41 * -0 .13 
with 
Challenger 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.18) (0.26) 
Likes 1.17* 1.16* 1.10* 1.35* 
Something 
About 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.24) 
Incumbent 
Dislikes 
-0.78* -0.77* -0.84* -0.58+ 
Something (0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.30) 
About 
Incumbent 
Likes 
-1.54* -1.53* -1.63* -1.43* 
Something 
About 
(0.19) (0.19) (0.24) (0.36) 
Challenger 
Dislikes 0.65* 0.64* 0.97* -0.23 
Something (0.21) (0.21) (0.26) (0.39) 
About 
Challenger 
Voted for - - - -0.008 0.19 -0.26 
Perot (0.16) (0.21) (0.26) 
N 811 803 562 241 
Log -267.5 -266.4 -178.1 -83.3 
Likelihood 
% Correctly 86 .6 86.4 87.9 85.5 
Predicted 
+ p < 0.10 
* p < 0.05 
Source: American National Election Study 1992 (ICPSR 6067) 
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Table 1 presents a direct test of the hypothesis that Perot voters 
were more likely to vote against the incumbent in the 1992 House 
elections. Column 1 contains the results for the standard model to 
provide a baseline for comparison. It is worth noting that the standard 
model performs exceedingly well. All of the variables work as 
expected, with the exception of familiarity with the incumbent, which 
can most likely be explained by the circumstances of 1992. Thanks to 
scandal and the like, incumbents were exceedingly well known in 1992, 
to the point that awareness of the incumbent contributed very little to 
the likelihood of voting for the incumbent. Column 2 presents the 
results for the model for Perot voters, and as is readily apparent, Perot 
voters were no more likely to vote against incumbents in 1992. As 
expected, the sign on the coefficient is negative, but not statistically 
significant. Columns 3 and 4 present the results of the model for 
Democratic incumbents and Republican incumbents respectively, in the 
event that the anti-incumbent tide might have been focused 
disproportionately on one of the two major parties. Again, the Perot 
variable fails to make a statistically significant contribution to the 
model in either equation. 
The initial evidence indicates that Perot voters failed to show their 
anti-incumbent stripes in the 1992 House races. Table 2 presents 
several variations on the theme, in an effort to isolate a possible Perot 
effect in particular races or among particular subsets of the voting 
population. Column 1 examines independent voters only, on the 
theory that independents might be more likely to act on Perot 's anti-
Washington message and vote against the incumbent. Again, however, 
the data provide little evidence that independent voters responded in this 
fashion. Column 2 focuses on races that had a strong challenger, 1 to see 
whether competitive challengers were able to exploit Perot's anti-
incumbency theme . Here, too, the results fail to indicate any 
significant Perot effect. Apparently, challengers were unable to exploit 
Perot's message on behalf of their candidacies . Column 3 narrows the 
focus to races in states where Perot ran well at the presidential level,2 
but even in these states Perot voters were no more likely to vote 
against incumbents . The last column focuses on Perot supporters--
those who rated Perot warmly on the feeling thermometer scale (60 or 
more)--but even strong supporters of Perot were no more likely to vote 
against incumbents. 
The absence of an anti-incumbent effect in 1992 is not just limited 
to Ross Perot. Table 3 examines the connection between support for 
1 Races with strong challengers were identified based on information 
presented in Congressional Quarterly's election outlook . 
2Defined as states where Perot received 21 % or more of the presidential 
vote. 
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term limitations and anti-incumbency in 1992. As is apparent from the 
results, voters who said they supported some form of term limitation 
(an overwhelming 80% of those surveyed) were also no more likely to 
"throw the rascal out" and vote to unseat their incumbent representative. 
Thus, whatever anti-incumbent mood might have existed in 1992, 
neither Ross Perot nor the term limitations movement succeeded in 
focusing this mood in the congressional races. 
TABLE 2. A CLOSER LOOK AT PEROT VOTERS IN 
HOUSE RACES 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: VOTE FOR INCUMBENT 
(Pro bit estimates) 
Independent Independent Strong 
Variables Voters Challengers 
Constant 0.78 -0.06 
(0.51) (0.54) 
Party ID 0.47* 1.36* 
(0.19) (0.23) 
Familiar 0.22 -0.39 
with (0.50) (0.54) 
Incumbent 
Familiar -0.25 0.15 
with (0.21) (0.38) 
Challenger 
Likes - - - 1.16* 
Something (0.14) 
About 
Incumbent 
Dislikes 
-0.65* -0.77* 
Something (0.21) (0.15) 
About 
Incumbent 
Likes 
-1.55* -1.53* 
Something 
About 
(0.26) (0.19) 
Challenger 
States 
Where 
Perot Did 
Well 
0.24 
(0.39) 
1.21 * 
(0.16) 
0.04 
(0.39) 
-0.41 * 
(0.18) 
1.10* 
(0.16) 
-0.84* 
(0.18) 
-1.63* 
(0.24) 
Perot Fans 
0.10 
(0.60) 
1.08* 
(0.18) 
0.56 
(0.57) 
-0.27 
(0.20) 
1.21* 
(0.20) 
-0.83* 
(0.22) 
-1.29* 
(0.28) 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Dislikes 
Something 
About 
Challenger 
Voted for 
Perot 
N 
Log 
Likelihood 
% 
Correctly 
Predicted 
+ p < 0.10 
* p < 0.05 
0.72* 
(0.28) 
-0.18 
(0.21) 
282 
-123.3 
81.6 
0.64* 0.97* 0.56+ 
(0.21) (0.26) (0.30) 
-0.008 0.19 0.06 
(0.16) (0.21) (0.18) 
803 562 380 
-266.4 -178.1 -133.2 
86.4 87.9 85 
Source: American National Election Studies 1992 (ICPSR 6067) 
TABLE 3. TERM LIMITATIONS AND ANTI-
INCUMBENCY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: VITTE FOR INCUMBENT 
(Pro bit estimates) 
Independent All 
Variables Incumbent Independent Perot Fans 
Races 
Constant 0.51 0.87 0.38 
(0.41) (0.62) (0.70) 
Party ID 1.19* 0.44* 1.08* 
(0.13) (0.17) (0. 18) 
Familiar 0.04 0.001 0.29 
with (0.36) (0.50) (0.66) 
Incumbent 
Familiar 
-0.28* -0.28 -0.25 
with 
Challenger 
(0.14) (0.23) (0.66) 
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States 
Where 
Perot Did 
Well 
0.35 
(0.61) 
1.06* 
(0.21) 
0.09 
(0.58) 
-0.21 
(0.23) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Likes 1.16* 1.31* 1.18* 1.06* 
Something 
About 
(0.14) (0.24) (0.20) (0.22) 
Incumbent 
Dislikes 
-0.73* -0.59* -0.82* -0.76* 
Something (0.15) 
About 
(0.24) (0.22) (0.22) 
Incumbent 
Likes 
-1.53* -1.79* -1.25* -1.33* 
Something 
About 
(0.19) (0.31) (0.28) (0.30) 
Challenger 
Dislikes 0.62* 0.51 0.56+ 0.61 
Something (0.21) 
About 
(0.32) (0.29) (0.38) 
Challenirer 
Support -0.16 -0.07 -0.07 -0.03 
Tenn (0.17) (0.30) (0.23) (0.27) 
Limitation 
N 765 275 364 321 
Log -251.2 -101.5 -128.9 -99.2 
Likelihood 
% 87.5 84.7 85.4 87.5 
Correctly 
Predicted 
+ p < 0.10 
* p < 0.05 
Source: American National Election Studies 1992 (ICPSR 6067) 
These results largely confirm Jacobson's conclusions concerning 
Perot's influence on the aggregate congressional vote (1993a: 178). 
Perot's supporters might have been expected to vote against incumbents 
in large numbers, but there is simply no evidence that they chose to do 
so. Whatever part of the Perot message resonated with voters, it seems 
apparent that the anti-incumbency theme did not play a part in House 
races.3 
A case might be made that the standard model described in Equation 
1 stacks the deck too much against finding a Perot effect in House 
3Similar results appeared in a preliminary analysis of Senate races. 
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races. After all, it may be the case that Perot's influence was indirect; 
that Perot's message might have operated on the vote choice through 
the candidate likes and dislikes measures, particularly incumbent 
dislikes and challenger likes. Two responses are in order. First, while 
we might expect a strong connection between the likes/dislikes 
responses and support for Perot, in fact there is very little connection 
apparent in the data. Most of the responses to both the challenger likes 
and incumbent dislikes questions refer to the personal characteristics of 
the candidates, and lack any clear-cut connection to the themes or 
candidacy of Ross Perot. Moreover, a simple model of these responses 
illustrates the absence of any connection between support for Ross 
Perot and evaluations of the congressional candidates: 
Equation 2: 
INCUMBENT= -1.49 - 0.52party + 0.13educ + 0.24interest -0.04perot 
DISLIKE (0.15) (0.09) (0.03) (0.05) (0.11) 
Equation 3: 
CHALLENGER= -2.09 + 0.68party + 0.14educ + 0.36interest -0.19perot 
l1KE (0.20) (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.14) 
(Note: results from probit estimation. Standard errors in parentheses.) 
By and large, candidate evaluations were a function of several prominent 
political characteristics of the respondents, including their party 
identification, level of education, and interest in the House race. Perot 
supporters are no more likely to offer an unfavorable evaluation of an 
incumbent or a favorable one of the challenger after controlling for 
these factors. 
One impressive finding that emerges from Tables 1 and 2, is the 
striking consistency of the parameter estimates across the various 
models. Despite the unusual character of the election (Jacobson 1993a), 
the conventional wisdom held pretty much true to form as far as 
individual vote decisions are concerned. In contested races with an 
incumbent , the vote was largely a function of party identification and 
the relative evaluations of the two candidates in the race. And on this 
basis, incumbents were by and large very successful in retaining their 
seats. In this sense at least, the 1992 House races were far from 
unusual, conforming to a pattern that has existed for almost two 
decades. 
Interestingly, the VRS national exit poll data produce a slightly 
different conclusion concerning the influence of Perot on incumbent 
House races. These differences may in fact be due to weaknesses in the 
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YRS data set; the exit poll focused primarily on the presidential 
contest, and the crucial evidence concerning voter information and 
evaluations so central to the results in Tables I and 2 is absent. Thus, 
the data permit only an incomplete test for the Perot's influence on the 
incumbent vote in 1992. 
Simple bivariate comparisons provide the first indication of a 
possible Perot effect nationwide. Individuals who voted for Ross Perot 
in the presidential race were somewhat more likely to vote against the 
incumbent in their local House race (Figure I), though the differences 
FIGURE 1. CROSST ABULATION OF PEROT VOTE BY 
HOUSE VOTE 
PRESIDENTIAL HOUSE VOTE 
VOTE Challenger Incumbent 
Other II 77.3% 83.0% 
Perot II 22.7% 17.0% 
N 8282 6066 
Chi square: 66.23 
are fairly slight (but statistically significant, as indicated by the chi-
square statistic). Apparently, however, the threshold here is the 
willingness to vote for Perot. Voters who claimed to support Perot in 
the survey but did not vote for him because they did not expect him to 
win showed no greater propensity to cast an anti-incumbent ballot in 
the House election (Figure 2). 
FIGURE 2. CROSSTABULATION OF SUPPORT FOR 
PEROT BY HOUSE VOTE 
SUPPORT FOR PEROT 
Would not support him 
Would have voted for Perot if he 
could win 
N 
Chi square: 
HOUSE 
Chall enger 
59.0% 
41.0% 
4704 
1.67 
VOTE 
I be ncum nt 
60.4% 
39.6% 
3632 
Since limitations in the YRS data prevent a complete test for the 
influence of Perot after controlling for the effects of other variables, the 
results in Table 4 present a limited test. The model employs several 
controls for individual voter characteristics, including party 
identification, level of education , a dummy measure for younger voters, 
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for the unemployed, and for first-time voters (on the theory that these 
groups might be somewhat more likely to vote against the incumbent 
in 1992). Also included in the model are two national issues variables 
and a Perot voter dummy variable. As the results in Column 1 
indicate, Perot voters were substantially more likely to vote against the 
incumbent in the 1992 House races. However, the disaggregated results 
in Columns 2 and 3 are even more interesting. As in the NES data, 
Democratic incumbents gained votes from the poor state of the 
TABLE 4. THE PEROT FACTOR IN HOUSE RACES: 
THE VRS EXIT POLL RESULTS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: VOTE FOR INCUMBENT 
(Probit estimates) 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
All Voters Democrats Republicans 
Constant 
Party Identification 
Level of Education 
First-Time Voter 
Young Voter 
Unemployed 
National Economy 
Personal Financial 
Situation 
Voted for Perot 
N 
Lo~ Likelihood 
% Correctly Predicted 
+ p < 0.10 
* p < 0.05 
-0.52* 
(0.06) 
1.51* 
(0.04) 
0.005 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
-0.06 
(0.08) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.21* 
(0.04) 
6307 
-3407.2 
75.7 
-0.43* -0.37* 
(0.08) (0.09) 
1.20* 1.33* 
(0.05) (0.06) 
-0.007 0.03 (0.02) 
(0.02) 
-0.07 0.02 
(0.08) (0.10) 
0.06 
-0.14* 
(0.06) (0.07) 
0.09 -0.02 
(0.10) (0.12) 
-0.23* 0.23* 
(0.03) (0.03) 
-0.20* 0.14* 
(0.03) (0.04) 
-0.34* -0.08 (0.06) 
(0.06) 
3214 2769 
-1681.8 -1447.6 
74.7 76.4 
Source: Voter Research Survey Exit Poll 1992 (ICPSR 6102) 
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economy, while Republicans lost votes. Moreover, Perot's supporters 
were markedly more likely to vote against Democratic incumbents than 
Republican incumbents, providing some initial indications of a fairly 
sweeping protest vote in 1992. 
The results of the analysis of the VRS exit poll data reveal a clear 
anti-incumbent tendency among Perot voters in House races, though the 
effect is relatively small. There are a number of possible explanations 
for these apparent differences. As noted above, the most significant of 
these is the differences in the contents of the two data sets, most 
notably the absence of any variables specifically focused on the House 
race in the YRS exit poll. Another likely source for the variance in 
these results is the differing samples of the two surveys. Both are 
designed to be random national samples, but the YRS survey casts its 
net much wider and contains nearly seven times the number of 
respondents . Further, neither are designed to be accurate district-level 
samples for the local House race, which could affect the results for 
either analysis. Finally, the different models and controls employed, 
particularly the absence of candidate effects in the YRS data, may mean 
that the Perot variable is picking up some of these effects. In the end, 
the more thorough NES survey at the congressional level, combined 
with the substantial weight of prior analyses of these data in other 
election years, renders the conclusions derived from the results in Tables 
1 and 2 more credible. 
Before turning to the Senate, Table 5 examines the results for open 
seat races in the NES survey. Here, Ross Perot does appear to have 
exerted an influence on these contests, if only in the sense that his 
focus on the economy made a difference in open seat races. 
Interestingly, Perot voters appear much more likely (other things being 
equal) to support Democratic candidates for open seats (Column I). But 
further inspection reveals that the Perot variable may be serving as a 
proxy for economic discontent in 1992. Equations 2 and 3 include 
several measures of the economy, and once they are incorporated into 
the equations, the Perot variable fails to exert significant influence. 
Interestingly, a strong anti-Republican bias appears in these results. 
Republican open seat candidates suffered greatly at the hands of voters 
who thought the national economy had gotten worse, that the country 
was no longer on the right track, or disapproved of George Bush's 
handling of the economy. Thus, if Perot's candidacy did indeed have an 
impact on the 1992 House races, it was probably to focus voter 
attention on the economy as the standard for judging all candidates for 
office. 
Despite the absence of a strong Perot effect, the results in Table 5 
raise the possibility that other national forces, most notably the 
economy, exerted a strong influence on the vote. In addition, the 
strongly partisan effects apparent in Table 5 are a striking finding as 
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TABLE 5. THE PEROT FACTOR AND OPEN SEAT 
RACES 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: VITTEIN OPEN SEAT RACE 
(Probit estimates) 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
Constant 
Interest in Politics 
Party Identification 
Likes Something 
About Democrat 
Dislikes Something 
About Democrat 
Likes Something 
About Republican 
Dislikes Something 
About Republican 
Voted for Perot 
National Economy 
Country on Right 
Track 
Approve Bush's 
Handling of Economy 
N 
Log Likelihood 
% Correctlv Predicted 
+ p < 0.10 
* p < 0.05 
0.72 
(0.34) 
-0.43 
(0.28) 
0.74* 
(0.17) 
1.87* 
(0.46) 
-2.00* 
(0.56) 
-2.21 * 
(0.44) 
1.01 * 
(0.50) 
1.06* 
(0.51) 
- --
---
---
158 
-45.3 
88.6 
0.76 0.32 
(0.49) (0.35) 
-0.67* -0.47* 
(0.32) (0.21) 
0.68 0.61* 
(0.18) (0.23) 
2.20* 2.52* 
(0.49) (0.62) 
-2.29* -3.04* 
(0.58) (0.77) 
-2.36* -2.63* 
(0.47) (0.59) 
1.21* 1.55* 
(0.52) (0.74) 
1.13* 0.91 
(0.57) (0.66) 
-1.08* -1.23* 
(0.35) (0.43) 
---
1.41 * 
(0.61) 
---
-1.16* 
(0.56) 
155 144 
-266.4 -30.8 
86.4 90.3 
Source: American National Election Studies 1992 (ICPSR 6067) 
well. Voters responded to national economic effects by evaluating open 
seat candidates in a highly partisan fashion, rewarding Democratic 
candidates and punishing Republican candidates for the dismal state of 
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TABLE 6. NATIONAL FORCES AND ANTI-
INCUMBENCY IN HOUSE RACES, 1992 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: VITTE FOR INCUMBENT 
(Probit estimates) 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Constant 
Party Identification 
Familiar with 
Incumbent 
Familiar with 
Challenger 
Likes Something 
About Incumbent 
Dislikes Something 
About Incumbent 
Likes Something 
About Challenger 
Dislikes Something 
About Challenger 
Personal Financial 
Status 
Country on Right 
Track 
National Economy 
Worse 
Disapprove Bush's 
Handling of the 
Economy 
N 
Log Likelihood 
% Correctly 
Predicted 
+ p < 0.10 
* p < 0.05 
All 
Incumbents 
0.46 
(0.39) 
1.14* 
(0.13) 
0.17 
(0.35) 
-0.30* 
(0.15) 
1.24* 
(0.14) 
-0.75* 
<0.15) 
-1.51 * 
(0.20) 
0.58* 
(0.21) 
0.04 
<0.08) 
0.33+ 
(0.17) 
-0.01 
(0.12) 
0.22 
(0.17) 
780 
-253 
86.7 
Democrats Republicans 
Only Only 
1.08* -0.58 
(0.47) (0.84) 
0.93* 0.99* 
(0.18) (0.26) 
0.09 0.82 
(0.41) (0.77) 
-0.5i* -0.22 
(0.19) (0.27) 
1.28* 1.21* 
(0.18) (0.27) 
-0.86* -0.58+ 
(0.18) (0.32) 
-1.66* -1.45* 
(0.25) <0.39) 
0.86* -0.16 
(0.27) (0.41) 
0.06 0.05 
(0.11) <0.14) 
0.48* -0.07 
(0.21) (0.34) 
0.12 0.42+ 
(0.15) (0.25) 
0.54* -0.58 
(0.21) (0.39) 
551 229 
-160.6 -78.3 
87.6 84.3 
Source: American National Election Studies 1992 (ICPSR 6067) 
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TABLE 7. CHECK BOUNCING, NATIONAL ISSUES, 
AND ANTI-INCUMBENY IN THE 1992 HOUSE RACES 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: VITTE FOR INCUMBENT 
(Probit estimates) 
Independent 
Variables Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 
Constant 0.32 0.23 0.47 0.36 
(0.63) (0.63) (0.65) (0.65) 
Party 1.38* 1.36* 1.38* 1.34* 
Identification (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Familiar with 0.40 0.39 0.53 0.51 
Incumbent (0.57) (0.57) (0.59) (0.59) 
Familiar with 
-0.46* -0.50* -0.51 * -0.58* 
Challenger (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) 
Likes 1.33* 1.35* 1.41* 1.42* 
Something (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) 
About 
Incumbent 
Dislikes 
-0.84* -0.84* -0.83* -0.83* 
Something 
About 
(0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) 
Incumbent 
Likes 
-1.58* -1.59* -1.58* -1.57* 
Something (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.29) 
About 
Challenger 
Dislikes 0.81* 0.80* 0.70* o.n* 
Something (0.28) 
About 
(0.28) (0.28) (0.29) 
Challenger 
Incumbent 
-0.33+ -0.32+ -0.32+ -0.07 
Bounced 
Checks 
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) 
National 
---
-0.24+ 
--- ---
Economy (0.14) 
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Table 7 (continued) 
Country on 
Right Track 
Bounced 
Checks x 
Ril!'ht Track 
N 
Log 
Likelihood 
% Correctly 
Predicted 
+ p < 0.10 
* p < 0.05 
---
- --
516 
-143.7 
89.9 
Moving From the Outside In? 
---
-0.71* 
---
(0.21) 
--- ---
-1.10* 
(0.31) 
515 503 503 
-142.2 -136.8 -134.8 
89.7 89.9 90.1 
Source: American National Election Studies 1992 (ICPSR 6067) 
the economy. This conclusion is reinforced in several analyses of the 
effects of national forces in incumbent races. In contrast to many of the 
findings of previous analyses, voters' evaluations of the economy and 
the scandal at the House bank exerted a strong, direct influence on 
individual vote decisions (Prinz 1993). Tables 6 and 7 clearly 
demonstrate the pervasive role that national forces played in the vote for 
House incumbents in 1992. 
Thus, to the extent that Ross Perot managed to focus voter 
attention on the economy and made it a crucial issue in the election, the 
data indicate Perot had a substantial impact on the 1992 House races. 
Unfortunately , no direct claims can be made from the data concerning 
Perot 's impact via the economy, but these results are highly suggestive. 
Most importantly, economic considerations mattered in incumbent races 
in 1992. Assessments of the national economy influenced the vote 
substantially, with Democratic incumbents benefitting from voter 
unhappiness and Republican incumbents paying the price. It is more 
than a little ironic that the majority of House Democrats appeared to 
benefit from the voters' desire for change, but that appears to be 
precisely what happened in 1992. 
Ross Perot and Anti-Incumbency in the 1992 Senate 
Elections 
Senate elections bear a number of notable differences from House 
races , not least of which is the fact that until recently Senate elections 
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were much less studied than House contests. Senate races also tend to 
be much more competitive than the typical House contest, since most 
Senate seats attract quality challengers who are able to raise the 
necessary campaign funds to wage a full-scale campaign. The available 
evidence also suggests that Senate contests are more subject to national 
forces than House contests, perhaps as a result of this greater 
competition. In a recent analysis of aggregate election returns, 
Abramowitz (1988) notes that the local candidates and their campaigns, 
particularly campaign spending, exerted a substantial influence on 
outcomes, but that national political conditions also shaped the vote. 
Similarly, Richard Born presents some reasons for expecting that 
evaluations of the economy and presidential performance matter for 
Senate incumbents seeking reelection (1991). Finally, Wright and 
Berkman (1986) find substantial evidence for the influence of candidate 
policy positions on vote choice, and for the interaction between issues 
and evaluations of the economy and the president. 
Unfortunately, most of the research on Senate elections focuses 
primarily on aggregate vote returns; with some limited exceptions 
(Westlye 1983; Wright 1989), a model of individual voting behavior in 
Senate elections is yet to be developed and tested. Thus, a first step is 
to develop a preliminary model of the individual vote choice similar to 
that presented in Equation I. Previous efforts and the aggregate results 
provide some obvious clues: certainly party and ideology matter in 
Senate contests, as do the spending activities of the two candidates and 
voters' evaluations of the candidates. Similarly, national forces need to 
be included in the model, to both control and test for their influence. 
Tables 8 and 9 present two attempts to develop and test a model of 
the individual vote in Senate elections, using both the NES and VRS 
data sets. In Table 8, the vote is modeled as a function of two 
characteristics of the voter (interest in the campaign and party 
identification), voters' evaluations of the candidates, and national forces 
(economic evaluations and the Perot variable). Put simply, there is 
little evidence of a Perot anti-incumbent effect in the data. In each 
model, the Perot variable fails to achieve standard levels of statistical 
significance, and is positive, indicating that voters who supported Perot 
are more likely to vote for the incumbent Evaluations of the candidates 
and national forces play a strong role, as expected. 
Analysis of the VRS exit poll data appear in Table 9. Again, there 
are relatively few control variables to incorporate into the data, because 
this test must be viewed as preliminary. As on the House side, the vote 
is modeled as a function of voter characteristics (party, ideology, first 
time voter, young voter), candidate activities (spending), and national 
issues. Party identification and the spending variables 4 are highly 
4Both absolute levels of spending and the logged values of these 
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TABLE 8. PEROT VOTERS IN THE 1992 SENATE 
RACES: A PRELIMINARY MODEL 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: VOIB FOR INCUMBENT 
(Probit estimates) 
+ p < 0.10 
* p < 0.05 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Constant 
Interest in the 
Campaign 
Party Identification 
Evaluations of 
Incumbent 
Evaluations of 
Challenger 
National Economy 
Voted for Perot 
N 
Log Likelihood 
% Correctlv Predicted 
ALL 
INCUMBENTS 
-0.43 
(0.38) 
-0.21 
(0.14) 
1.00* 
(0.16) 
0.04* 
(0.004) 
-0.03* 
(0.004) 
0.33* 
(0.14) 
0.18 
(0.20) 
540 
-170.9 
87.8 
Source: American National Election Studies 1992 (ICPSR 6067) 
variables were tested, and both sets of variables displayed similar 
relationships. The results presented in Table 8 are for total candidate 
spending. 
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TABLE 9. PEROT VOTERS IN SENATE RACES: THE 
VRS EXIT POLL DATA 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: VOfE FOR INCUMBENT 
(Probit estimates) 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
All Democrats Republicans 
In be cum nts IY n1y Onl O I 
Constant 
-0.67* -0.34 0.17 
(0.12) (0.24) (0.29) 
Party Identification 1.06* 0.89* 0.97* 
(0.07) (0.10) (0.12) 
Ideology 0.90* 0.82 0.67* 
(0.07) (0.11) (0.11) 
First-Time Voter -0.03 0.005 0.12 
(0.02) (0.16) (0.19) 
Young Voter -0.02 -0.09 -0.01 
(0.09) (0.13) (0.14) 
Incumbent Spending 0.00003 0.00002 
-0.0002+ 
(0.00003) (0.00008) (0.0001) 
Challenger 
-0.0001* -0.0002* 0.00008* 
Spending (0 .0004) (0.00008) (0.0001) 
National Economy 
-0.05* -0.25* 0.22* 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) 
Personal Financial 0.04 
-0.18* 0.33* 
Status (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) 
State 0.05 -0.04 (0.05) 0.13 
Unemolovment (0.03) (0.09) 
Voted for Perot -0.07 
-0.33* 0.18 
(0.08) (0.12) (0.13) 
N 1701 944 757 
Log Likelihood -884 -465.1 -365.2 
% Correctly 75.2 76.7 77.8 
Predicted 
+ p < 0.10 
* p < 0.05 
Source: Voter Research Surveys Exit Poll 1992 (ICPSR 6102) 
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significant in the model, and national issues, especially the economy, 
also emerge as an important determinant of the vote. Overall, the Perot 
variable fails to achieve standard levels of statistical significance, 5 but 
the data for Democratic and Republican incumbents again reveal some 
interesting trends. As on the House side, Democratic incumbent 
Senators benefitted from voters' poor evaluation of the economy, while 
Republican incumbents tended to lose support. Also, Perot voters were 
much more likely to vote against Democratic incumbents in the Senate 
race, and to support Republican incumbents. 
Conclusion 
The data and analysis presented in this paper have perhaps raised 
more questions than they answer. With some notable exceptions, the 
evidence convincingly demonstrates the absence of a Perot influence in 
the 1992 congressional elections. Yet, it is the exceptions that are 
perhaps most interesting: why is there a strong Perot influence on the 
House side in the VRS exit poll data? Are the models' different 
specifications sufficient to explain this outcome? Is it indeed the case 
that the Perot variable is capturing the effects of local candidates and 
campaigns, and if these were incorporated into the model, the Perot 
effect would disappear, as it does in the NES data? Similarly, why are 
Perot voters so selective in their anti-incumbent wrath, choosing to 
exercise it more on Democratic incumbents? This finding may provide 
some useful preliminary evidence that Perot's supporters were 
exercising a kind of global rationality in 1992, seeking to replace all of 
those in power with other candidates. 
Before rushing to the conclusion that Perot exerted little influence 
on the 1992 congressional elections, it is important to place these 
results in a particular context and to provide some interpretation. There 
is no denying that Ross Perot's entry into the presidential campaign 
fundamentally altered the political landscape, changing the dynamics of 
many campaigns. The fact that the economy was so central to 
outcomes in 1992 (in contrast to previous studies of House and Senate 
elections) perhaps best exemplifies the kind of influence that might be 
attributed to Perot and the presidential race in general. Put simply, 
when voters are fed up with politics as usual, they usually respond at 
the polls, and Perot probably helped by giving force and focus to their 
discontent. 
There were also a number of important limits to Perot's influence 
on congressional races. For one , the uncertain character of Perot's 
candidacy probably served to dampen any impact he might have had on 
5Bivariate comparisons of the Perot vote variable and the Senate vote 
revealed a similar null relationship . 
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voters in congressional elections. The timing of Perot's entry into the 
presidential race is also an issue: he came to prominence too late for 
many prospective candidates to enter the race and exploit his populist 
message. In addition, many challengers would have had considerable 
difficulty walking a fine line between maintaining their base of partisan 
support and attracting potential Perot voters. Finally, Perot may yet 
exert considerable influence over future House races. Perot's recent 
emphasis on the local impact of the NAFT A treaty is perhaps the most 
prominent case in point In addition, there is evidence that United We 
Stand America is seeking to organize at the grass-roots level in 
congressional districts, and the "Perotistas" have publicly professed a 
greater commitment to and involvement in statewide and local elections 
in the future. It remains to be seen whether these efforts will have a 
substantial impact on future election outcomes . 
One final observation concerning the outsider influence and 
competition in congressional elections is in order . In the past two 
election cycles, many incumbents have been rendered noticeably 
vulnerable, thanks to a poorly performing economy, scandal, 
redistricting, and a host of other forces. Yet, in each of these elections, 
many incumbents have been able to survive, thanks in large part to the 
fact that they faced weak or no opposition. Jacobson and Kernell 
(1983) have argued persuasively that quality challengers engage in 
strategic behavior, selectively choosing their time to enter a race against 
an incumbent when the political winds look favorable. The interesting 
thing to note here is that the early judgments have been largely 
incorrect, casting some doubt on the rationality of these early decisions. 
In order for the outsider force (or any other) to have a substantial impact 
on the Congress, it is necessary for well-qualified candidates to be 
willing to throw their hats in the ring early and face an incumbent. It 
remains to be seen whether the experience of 1990 and 1992 are 
reflected in a greater willingness on the part of experienced politicians 
to challenge incumbents for their seats. 
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